College Football’s Gini Coefficient Is 0.37 — Worse Than MLB, Approaching US Income Inequality

Texas A&M spent $51.4 million on NIL. The average Group of 5 school spent $3 million. That’s a 14x gap. The executive order aims to compress it — and the math says it would push the entire sport toward Notre Dame’s spending level.

By The Sports Page · April 11, 2026 · Part 2 of 5: The Executive Order and College Football

0.37

CFB NIL Gini Coefficient

14×

Top-to-Bottom Spending Ratio

$20.5M

Revenue-Share Cap Under EO

NIL Spending by Program, 2025–26 Cycle (Estimated)

Rank	School	Conference	Est. NIL Spend	vs. Cap
1	Texas A&M	SEC	$51.4M	+$30.9M
2	Texas	SEC	$46.2M	+$25.7M
3	Georgia	SEC	$42.8M	+$22.3M
4	Ohio State	B1G	$41.5M	+$21.0M
5	Alabama	SEC	$39.0M	+$18.5M
6	Oregon	B1G	$37.1M	+$16.6M
7	Tennessee	SEC	$35.4M	+$14.9M
8	LSU	SEC	$34.0M	+$13.5M
9	Michigan	B1G	$32.5M	+$12.0M
10	USC	B1G	$31.0M	+$10.5M
11	Ole Miss	SEC	$29.2M	+$8.7M
12	Miami (FL)	ACC	$28.0M	+$7.5M
13	Florida	SEC	$26.5M	+$6.0M
14	Penn State	B1G	$25.8M	+$5.3M
15	Oklahoma	SEC	$24.0M	+$3.5M
16	Auburn	SEC	$22.5M	+$2.0M
17	Colorado	B12	$21.0M	+$0.5M
18	Notre Dame	Ind.	$20.0M	−$0.5M
19	Clemson	ACC	$18.5M	−$2.0M
20	South Carolina	SEC	$16.0M	−$4.5M
21	Arkansas	SEC	$14.0M	−$6.5M
22	Wisconsin	B1G	$12.5M	−$8.0M
23	Indiana	B1G	$10.0M	−$10.5M
24	Iowa State	B12	$8.0M	−$12.5M
25	Memphis	AAC	$5.5M	−$15.0M
26	Boise State	MWC	$4.0M	−$16.5M
27	Appalachian St.	SBC	$3.0M	−$17.5M
28	Avg. G5 School	G5	$2.0M	−$18.5M

Sources: On3, Opendorse, Business of College Sports, institutional disclosures. Figures are estimates based on collective and direct NIL deal reporting.

The numbers above tell a story that doesn’t require a degree in economics to understand. The top school in the country spends more than 25 times what the average Group of 5 program spends. The top five schools alone account for roughly as much total NIL spending as the bottom 80 FBS programs combined. This isn’t competitive imbalance. This is structural inequality — the kind economists measure with a tool called the Gini coefficient.

The Gini coefficient is a single number between 0 and 1 that captures how evenly a resource is distributed. Zero means perfect equality — every school spends exactly the same amount. One means perfect inequality — a single school has all the money and everyone else has nothing. The current NIL Gini for FBS college football is 0.37. For context, the United States income Gini is 0.39. College football’s spending inequality is approaching the level of the entire American economy.

This matters because the executive order signed on April 3 explicitly targets this concentration. The order bans what it calls “fraudulent NIL schemes” — deals where athletes receive payment unconnected to any legitimate marketing value — and, critically, caps revenue-sharing arrangements at $20.5 million per school. Revenue-sharing is the mechanism through which most large-scale NIL spending now flows. The cap is designed to compress the distribution: it doesn’t raise the floor, but it lowers the ceiling dramatically.

Look at the table again. Notre Dame at $20 million sits essentially at the cap. Sixteen schools above it would need to cut spending by an average of $13 million. Every school below it would be unaffected. The EO doesn’t ask Notre Dame to change. It asks the other 130 FBS programs to look more like Notre Dame.

“The Gini coefficient of college football NIL spending is 0.37. That’s more unequal than Major League Baseball — a sport with no salary cap. The executive order is trying to impose a cap on a sport that has never had one.”

— The Sports Page, on NIL inequality

Inequality Across Leagues: The Gini Comparison

League / System	Gini Coefficient	Mechanism	Parity Level
NFL	0.05	Hard salary cap + floor	Near-perfect equality
NBA	0.15	Soft cap + luxury tax	Moderate equality
MLB	0.25	Luxury tax (no cap)	Moderate inequality
CFB under EO (proj.)	0.20–0.25	$20.5M rev-share cap	Compressed toward MLB
CFB NIL (current)	0.37	No cap, no floor	High inequality
US Income	0.39	Market economy	High inequality
US Wealth	0.85	Compounding returns	Extreme inequality

The NFL, with its hard salary cap and salary floor, achieves a Gini of 0.05 — spending is nearly identical across all 32 teams. That’s by design. The result is parity: 14 different teams have reached the Super Bowl in the last seven seasons. The NBA’s soft cap with a luxury tax produces a Gini of 0.15 — some inequality, but limited. MLB, with only a luxury tax and no hard cap, sits at 0.25. College football, with no cap, no floor, and no collective bargaining agreement, is at 0.37 — worse than every professional league in the country.

What the Executive Order Actually Does to NIL

Bans “fraudulent NIL schemes.” The EO defines these as deals where athletes receive compensation “unconnected to a bona fide business purpose.” In practice, this targets collectives that funnel booster money to athletes through sham marketing contracts. A quarterback who appears in a car dealership commercial is fine. A third-string long snapper receiving $200,000 from a collective for “social media promotion” with 400 followers is not. The line is blurry, and enforcement will determine everything.

Caps revenue-sharing at $20.5 million. This is the structural change. Revenue-sharing — where schools directly share athletic revenue with athletes — has become the primary vehicle for large-scale NIL spending. The House v. NCAA settlement established the framework; the EO caps it. At $20.5 million, the cap sits precisely where mid-tier Power conference programs currently spend. It compresses from the top without lifting the bottom. The projected effect on the Gini coefficient: a drop from 0.37 to somewhere between 0.20 and 0.25.

“Notre Dame spends $20 million on NIL. The revenue-share cap is $20.5 million. The EO doesn’t ask Notre Dame to change. It asks everyone else to become Notre Dame.”

— The Sports Page, on the cap and the convergence point

The Math: Calculating the NIL Gini Coefficient

The Gini coefficient measures inequality on a 0–1 scale. Zero means every school spends the same. One means a single school has all the money.

The Gini coefficient formula: G = (1/2n²μ) × Σ|x_i - x_j| for all pairs i,j Where: n = number of schools (134 FBS programs) μ = mean NIL spending (~$12.8M) x_i = spending for school i Simplified calculation using the 28-school sample: Mean spending: $12.8M Median spending: $8.0M Top quartile avg: $38.2M Bottom quartile avg: $3.4M Ratio (top/bottom): 11.2x Lorenz curve: Bottom 50% of schools control ~22% of total spending Top 10% of schools control ~35% of total spending Gini = 2 × (area between Lorenz curve and equality line) Result: G = 0.37 Context: NFL Gini: 0.05 (hard cap works) NBA Gini: 0.15 (soft cap works, sort of) MLB Gini: 0.25 (luxury tax = weak deterrent) CFB Gini: 0.37 (no cap = free market) US Income: 0.39 (the whole economy)

The bottom 50% of FBS schools control just 22% of total NIL spending. The top 10% control 35%. This is what a Gini of 0.37 looks like in practice: the rich schools aren’t just richer — they’re operating in a different financial universe.

The Math: Projected Compression Under the EO

The $20.5M revenue-share cap doesn’t eliminate inequality. It compresses it from the top.

Current distribution (top 16 schools above cap): Avg spending: $32.2M Spending above cap: $11.7M avg excess Total excess: ~$187M across 16 schools Under $20.5M cap: All 16 schools capped at $20.5M max rev-share Spending above $20.5M must come from legitimate, verifiable NIL deals only New projected distribution: Top quartile avg: $20.5M (was $38.2M) Bottom quartile avg: $3.4M (unchanged) New ratio (top/bottom): 6.0x (was 11.2x) New Gini: ~0.20–0.25 That’s a 32–46% reduction in inequality. The convergence point: Notre Dame current: $20.0M EO cap: $20.5M Gap: $0.5M Notre Dame is already AT the cap. 16 schools must come DOWN to ND’s level. The rest are already below it. The EO makes Notre Dame the median spender among Power programs — without Notre Dame changing a single dollar.

The compression is significant. A Gini of 0.20–0.25 would put college football in the range of MLB or the NBA — leagues with much stronger competitive balance than the current free-for-all. But only if the cap is enforced.

Historical Parallels: Caps, Taxes, and Enforcement

NFL Salary Cap, 1994 — The Hard Cap That Created Parity

0.05

NFL Spending Gini (post-cap)

Before the salary cap, the Dallas Cowboys and San Francisco 49ers dominated through spending. Jerry Jones and Eddie DeBartolo outbid everyone for free agents, and the results were predictable: those two franchises won five of six Super Bowls from 1993 to 1998. The NFL salary cap, introduced in 1994 alongside a salary floor, compressed spending to near-perfect equality. Since then, 20 different teams have won the Super Bowl. The cap works because it’s a hard cap — exceed it, and you lose draft picks, face fines, and have contracts voided. Enforcement is absolute.

Hard cap + real enforcement = parity. The model the EO aspires to.

MLB Luxury Tax, 1997 — The Soft Cap the Rich Pay Through

0.25

MLB Spending Gini (with luxury tax)

Major League Baseball has never had a salary cap. Instead, it uses a competitive balance tax — a surcharge on payrolls above a threshold (currently $237 million). The theory: make overspending expensive enough to deter it. The practice: the New York Yankees, Los Angeles Dodgers, and New York Mets simply pay the tax and keep spending. The Dodgers paid $32 million in luxury tax penalties in 2024 alone and won the World Series. The MLB luxury tax proves that a soft cap is just a cost of doing business for programs with deep enough pockets.

Soft cap + wealthy owners = inequality with a surcharge

This is the central question for the executive order: will it function like the NFL salary cap or the MLB luxury tax? A hard cap with rigorous enforcement produces parity. A soft cap that the wealthiest programs can work around through creative deal structures, legitimate NIL arrangements, or simple noncompliance produces the same inequality with a thin veneer of regulation. The EO’s enforcement mechanism — tying compliance to federal research grants — is theoretically powerful. A university risking $200 million in federal research funding over an extra $15 million in NIL spending makes the math obvious. But “theoretically powerful” and “consistently enforced” are two very different things.

The revenue-share cap also leaves a significant loophole: direct NIL deals that aren’t classified as revenue-sharing. If a local car dealership in Austin pays a Texas quarterback $2 million for a commercial, that’s a legitimate marketing deal — not revenue-sharing. The cap wouldn’t apply. The question is whether schools above the cap simply reclassify spending as direct NIL rather than revenue-sharing. If they do, the Gini stays at 0.37 with different accounting. If enforcement closes that loophole, the compression is real.